To learn more, view our Privacy Policy. To browse Academia. Log in with Facebook Log in with Google. Remember me on this computer. Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link. Need an account? Click here to sign up. Download Free PDF. Commerce arts A short summary of this paper. One key element of leadership is the ability to get others to do something, creating an influence.
This paper is designed to help familiarise readers with the concepts related to motivation. Some popular theories will be reviewed and discussed. A leader must be able to motivate others to achieve goals, accomplish tasks, and complete objectives. Motivation is one key indicator of behaviour.
We behave in a way that will satisfy motive based on a need. Knowing potential areas of motivation, like the ones discussed in this module, can provide guidance in working with and discussing concerns with others. Motivation is what causes us to act, whether it is getting a glass of water to reduce thirst or reading a book to gain knowledge. It involves the biological, emotional, social, and cognitive forces that activate behavior.
In everyday usage, the term motivation is frequently used to describe why a person does something. Motives are the "whys" of behaviour - the needs or wants that drive behaviour and explain what we do.
Motive is the inner state that energises, activates, or moves, and directs behaviour towards goals. We don't actually observe a motive; rather, we infer that one exists based on the behaviour we observe. Extrinsic motivations are those that arise from outside of the individual and often involve rewards such as trophies, money, social recognition or praise.
Intrinsic motivations are those that arise from within the individual, such as doing a complicated cross-word puzzle purely for the personal gratification of solving a problem Types of Needs Need may be natural, biological phenomenon in an individual, or these may develop over the period of time through learning.
Needs may be primary needs or secondary needs Primary needs: primary needs are also known as physiological, biological, basic or unlearned needs. These are animal drives that are essential for survival. These needs are food, sex, sleep, air to breathe, satisfactory temperature.
Secondary needs: As contrast to primary needs, secondary needs are not natural but are learned by the individual through his experience and interaction.
Therefore these are also called learned or derived needs. Motivation and Behaviour Motivation causes goal directed behaviour. Need is the base for motivation which is a kind of mental feeling in an individual that he needs something.
The individual tries to overcome this by engaging himself in a behaviour through which he satisfies his needs. This is goal directed behaviour and it leads to goal fulfillment and individual succeeds in fulfilling his needs and thereby overcoming his tension in the favourable environment.
Behaviour ends the moment tension is released. However satisfaction of one needs leads to feeling of another need, either same need after some time or different need and goal directed behaviour goes on. Thus goal directed behaviour is a continuous process.
However if the need is not satisfies because of some reasons, the person may feel frustration which can be defined as accumulation of tension due to non fulfillment of needs.
At this stage the individual will try to modify his behavior to eliminate factors for non fulfillment of his needs. For example, putting more force need satisfactions. Maslow developed the hierarchy of needs consisting of five hierarchic classes.
According to Maslow, people are motivated by unsatisfied needs. If there are deficits on this level, all behavior will be oriented to satisfy this deficit. Essentially, if you have not slept or eaten adequately, you won't be interested in your self-esteem desires. Subsequently we have the second level, which awakens a need for security. After securing those two levels, the motives shift to the social sphere, the third level. Psychological requirements comprise the fourth level, while the top of the hierarchy consists of self-realization and self-actualization.
Only unsatisfied needs influence behavior, satisfied needs do not. The further the progress up the hierarchy, the more individuality, humanness and psychological health a person will show. Herzberg's two-factor Hygiene —Motivation theory Frederick Herzberg's two-factor theory concludes that certain factors in the workplace result in job satisfaction, but if absent, they don't lead to dissatisfaction but no satisfaction. Herzberg concluded that job satisfaction and dissatisfaction were the products of two separate factors: motivating factors satisfiers and hygiene factors dissatisfiers.
By doing so, Hume goes some way toward indicating how good character is different from continence. Someone whose self-esteem is based on an enjoyment taken in deliberation will be attuned to wider complications and will have the wider imaginative powers needed for correct deliberation from a steady and general point of view. Another illustration of the use of Greek views of character can be found in the writings of Karl Marx — and John Stuart Mill — Although Marx is best known for his virulent criticism of capitalism and Mill for his exposition and defense of liberal utilitarianism, these philosophers are treated together here because their approach to character is at crucial points deeply Aristotelian.
Aristotle emphasized the need for a special type of political community. Marx attended to smaller democratic workplaces. Workers who are committed to capitalist values are characterized primarily by self-interested attitudes. Given these attitudes, they are prone to a number of vices, including cowardice, intemperance, and lack of generosity.
If work is re-organized to enable workers to express their rational powers, then each worker will perform tasks that are interesting and mentally challenging no worker will perform strictly monotonous, routine, unskilled tasks. In addition, workers will participate in deliberations about the ends to be achieved by the work they do and how to achieve those ends. And, finally, these deliberations will be organized democratically so that the opinions of each worker are fairly taken into account.
Marx suggests that if work is reorganized in these ways, it will promote feelings of solidarity and camaraderie among workers and eventually between these workers and those in similar situations elsewhere.
For the fact that workers can express their characteristic human powers in action, coupled with the egalitarian conditions in the workplace, can upset competitive feelings and promote respect by removing the bases for inferiority and superiority. Workers then come to exhibit some of the more traditional virtues such as generosity and trustfulness, and avoid some of the more traditional vices such as cowardice, stinginess, and self-indulgence.
For further discussion of the extent to which Marx drew on Aristotle, see DeGolyer John Stuart Mill — defended a version of liberal utilitarianism, but scholars disagree about what kind of utilitarianism that was. We can safely say that, as a utilitarian, Mill thought human conduct should promote the happiness or welfare of those affected.
But was Mill an act-utilitarian, who thought that right acts are those that promote as much happiness as can be done on the particular occasion, given the alternatives available to the agent? Or was he a rule-utilitarian, who thought that right conduct was conduct permitted by rules that, when publicly known to be generally accepted or followed, would maximize happiness or welfare?
Or was he a motive-utilitarian, who thought that one should act as the person with the motives or virtues most productive of happiness should act?
He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. As a person develops his powers of practical deliberation and comes to enjoy their exercise, he gains the self-esteem that is the basis of a virtuous and well-lived life. For example, Mill argued, in deep disagreement with the views of his own time, that societies that have systematically subordinated women have harmed both men and women, making it almost impossible for men and women to form relationships of genuine intimacy and understanding.
Among working class men, the fact that wives were excessively dependent on their husbands inspired meanness and savagery. Women who have been legally and socially subordinated to men become meek, submissive, self-sacrificing, and manipulative. In brief, men evidence the vices of the slave master, while women evidence the vices of the slave. Only under such conditions could women and men acquire feelings of real self-esteem rather than feelings of false inferiority and superiority.
He believed that by participating in these institutions, Athenians were called upon to rise above their individual partialities and to consider the general good. And like Marx, Mill recognized the morally disturbing effects of a life limited to routine and unskilled labor. In Principles of Political Economy , he recommended that relations of economic dependence between capitalists and workers be eliminated in favor of cooperatives either of workers with capitalists or of workers alone.
In these associations members were to be roughly equal owners of tools, raw materials, and capital. They worked as skilled craftspersons under self-imposed rules.
They elected and removed their own managers. Green — began as a student and teacher of classics before turning to philosophy. And that requires aiming at the good of others for their own sake. He notes that both virtues appear to be more restricted in scope than commonsense would suggest. A man who faces death by drowning or disease is not courageous. Not every form of restraint counts as temperance for Aristotle.
It is limited to restraint of the pleasures of appetitive desires for food, drink, and sex, the pleasures we share with non-human animals. Green recognizes that Aristotle needs to check these appetitive desires because intemperance is a danger to the common good.
Green was right to find his views anticipated in the Greeks. In contrast to many of his contemporaries who focused on meta-ethical questions and the meaning of moral terms, Rawls — moved moral and political philosophy in a practical direction and stimulated modern philosophers to explore the psychological grounding of good moral character.
These points, Rawls claims, have always been recognized. How do just institutions shape our wants and aims and affect the sort of people we become? These are the institutions that make social cooperation possible and productive. They include the political constitution, the structure of the economy, legalized forms of property ownership, the family in some form, and others. Rawls defends two principles of justice as regulations for the basic structure of his just society: 1 the equal liberties principle, according to which each person has the same claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties.
These conditions are fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. This principle covers two types of liberties, personal liberties and political liberties. Under this principle, each person is entitled to liberties of both kinds as a basic right.
This means that chances to hold office and to exercise political influence must be independent of socio-economic position. Moreover, Rawls agrees with Mill that political participation contributes to the moral development of citizens. As noted in Section 3. In part III, Rawls turns to the question of how individuals acquire a desire to act justly, and to do so for the right reasons, when they have lived under and benefited from just institutions a, First, Rawls holds, as Aristotle did, that if proper institutions are in place, then the attitudes and behaviors associated with the desire to act justly will emerge naturally, as a result of psychological tendencies persons experience in ordinary life.
Second, and again like Aristotle, Rawls argues that if citizens are fortunate to live in a community that provides the basic goods they need for realizing their powers and that offers them opportunities to develop and use their abilities in shared activities with others, then they will develop a stable sense of their own value that is based on their own accomplishments and their status as equal citizens, rather than on a position more advantaged relative to others.
With a stable sense of their own value and a reasonable hope of achieving their aims, citizens will want to act justly for the right reasons.
Only a brief discussion of these points of coincidence is possible here. Consider, first, sections 72—75 of A Theory of Justice , where Rawls outlines what he calls the three stages of moral development, governed by three psychological laws.
These laws explain how individuals come to have new, non-derivative, final ends as they acquire ties of love, friendship, affection, and trust. This happens when members do their parts responsibly, each contributing to a mutually recognized goal, and where all participants display appropriate abilities. Because the activities are complementary, individuals can see themselves in what others do. Their self-love, to use Aristotelian language, becomes a group achievement.
Finally, at the third stage, as individuals come to realize how the institutions regulated by the principles of justice promote their good and the good of their fellow citizens, they become attached to these principles and develop a desire to apply and to act in accordance with them. The provision of equal liberties in accordance with the first principle of justice enables citizens to form the associations in which their common aims and ideals can be pursued.
As we have seen, these associations are necessary for self-respect to be produced and maintained. Taken together, these two principles ensure that persons have reasonable hopes of achieving their aims. In these various ways, the two principles, in combination, amount to a publicly acknowledged recognition that each citizen has equal worth. Once these just institutions are in place, Rawls thinks that the worst aspects of the social division of labor can be overcome. Here Rawls notes the same problems with many types of paid labor that so disturbed Aristotle.
Of course, Rawls does not suggest solving these problems as Aristotle did. Marx, Mill, and Rawls suggest how character can be molded by antecedent circumstances — Marx by economic structures; Mill by paid work, political life, and family relationships; Rawls by the institutions regulated by the two principles of justice. Yet these insights about the effect of institutions on character seem to raise other, more troubling questions: if our character is the result of social and political institutions beyond our control, then perhaps we are not in control of our characters at all and becoming decent is not a real possibility.
Among contemporary philosophers, Susan Wolf is one of several who address these worries. In her Freedom Within Reason Wolf argues that almost any morally problematic upbringing could be coercive and could render a person unable to see what he ought morally to do or render him unable to act on that recognition.
As examples, Wolf cites ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany, white children of slave owners in the s, and persons brought up to embrace conventional sex roles. Wolf thinks that there is no method for determining which upbringings and influences are consistent with an ability to see what should be done and to act accordingly, and hence she thinks there is always the risk that we are less responsible for our actions than we may hope.
Such skepticism may be misplaced. For if good character is based on naturally occurring psychological responses that most people including persons brought up to embrace racist and sexist beliefs experience without difficulty, then most people should be able to become better and to be responsible for actions that express or could express their character.
In modern societies, for example, many adults still work at alienating jobs that do not afford opportunity to realize the human powers and to experience the pleasures of self-expression.
Women in particular, because of unequal domestic arrangements, nearly total responsibility for childcare, and sex segregation in the workplace, often endure low-paying, dead-end jobs that encourage feelings of self-hatred. In a family where economic, and hence psychological, power is unequal between women and men, affection, as Mill recognized, may harm both parties. Thus many women and men today may not be well-positioned to develop fully the psychological capacities Aristotle, Marx, Mill, and Rawls considered foundational to virtuous character.
These considerations indicate why character has become a central issue not only in ethics, but also in feminist philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of education, and philosophy of literature.
If developing good moral character requires being members of a community in which citizens can fully realize their human powers and ties of friendship, then one needs to ask how educational, economic, political, and social institutions should be structured to make that development possible. Some contemporary philosophers are now addressing these issues. For example, Martha Nussbaum uses Aristotelian virtues to outline a democratic ideal in b. In Andrew Mason explores how capitalist market forces make it difficult for virtues to flourish.
In Jon Elster interprets Marx as offering a conception of the good life that consists in active self-realization, which can be promoted or blocked by economic and political institutions. Rosalind Hursthouse applies an Aristotelian view of the emotions to an investigation of racist attitudes in And if one is interested in understanding what the nature of moral character is and the extent to which it can be altered, one will find useful examples of both good and bad moral character in literary writers.
Finally, it might be useful to note that this brief discussion of the history of philosophical views of character indicates that character has played, or can play, an important role in a variety of western ethical traditions, from Greek virtue-centered views to Kantianism to utilitarianism to Marxism.
Nevertheless, some of the views surveyed here seem to give a more prominent role to character and virtue than do others. It is not easy to explain precisely what this prominence consists in. Although a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this essay, a preliminary indication of how they might be addressed can be provided.
For further discussion of these questions, see Trianosky , Watson , Homiak , and Hursthouse The virtuous person has the properly cultivated tendencies to feel that make it easier for her to perform her imperfect duties. These feelings support her recognition of what is right and are a sign that she is disposed to perform her duties.
One might put this point by saying that, for Kant, virtuous character is subordinate to the claims of practical reason. This enjoyment guides her practical determinations of what actions are appropriate in what circumstances and renders her unattracted to the pleasures associated with the common vices.
Her properly cultivated emotional tendencies are not viewed as recalcitrant aspects of her being that need to be controlled by reason. Rather, her practical decisions are informed and guided by the enjoyment she takes in her rational powers. One might then ask of other ethical views whether they take practical deliberation to be subordinate to character or vice versa. As this entry has indicated, Hume appears to side with Aristotle and to give character priority over practical deliberation.
For he suggests that someone with the natural virtues based on self-esteem will have the wider imaginative powers needed for correct deliberation from the standpoint of the judicious spectator. Whether character is subordinate to reason for Mill may depend on what sort of utilitarianism Mill can be shown to espouse. If he is a motive-utilitarian who thinks that one should act as the person with the motives or virtues most productive of happiness would act, then a case could be made for his giving character priority over practical reason.
If, on the other hand, he is an act- or rule-utilitarian, he would seem to give character a role that is subordinate to reason. This section will begin with a brief discussion of some recent philosophical work on character that relies on results in experimental social psychology.
This philosophical work calls into question the conceptions of character and virtue that are of concern especially to the ancient Greek moralists and to contemporary philosophers whose work derives from ancient views.
Doris and others argue that traits are not robust in this sense. They are not stable or consistent and are wrongly invoked to explain why people act as they do. Rather, these philosophers argue, and as the experimental tradition indicates, much of human behavior is attributable to seemingly trivial features of the situations in which persons find themselves.
For variations on this view, see Harman , , Doris , and Vranas It is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss this work in detail. Some summary remarks, however, are in order.
For a detailed discussion, see the entries on empirical approaches to moral character , section 1, and moral psychology: empirical approaches , section 4. Skepticism about robust traits of character emerges from some famous experiments in social psychology. For example, in one experiment persons who found a dime in a phone booth were far more likely to help a confederate who dropped some papers than were those who did not find a dime.
Another experiment involved seminary students who agreed to give a talk on the importance of helping those in need. On the way to the building where their talks were to be given, they encountered a confederate slumped over and groaning. Those who were told they were already late were much less likely to help than those who were told they had time to spare.
Perhaps most damning for the robust view of character are the results of the experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram in the s. Philosophers influenced by the experimental tradition in social psychology conclude that people do not have the broadly based, stable, consistent traits of character that were of interest to the ancient and modern moralists, or to contemporary philosophers working with some version of those views.
Persons are helpful when in a good mood, say, but not helpful when in a hurry, or they are honest at home but not honest at work. This skepticism about robust traits thus poses a challenge to contemporary philosophers, especially those who work with some version of the ancient views, to develop an account of character that is consistent with empirical results.
These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology have been challenged by both psychologists and philosophers, especially by philosophers working in the tradition of virtue ethics see related entry on virtue ethics , who claim that the character traits criticized by situationists have little to do with the conception of character associated with the ancient and modern moralists. The objectors say that the situationists rely on an understanding of character traits as isolated and often non-reflective dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways.
They wrongly assume that traits can be determined from a single type of behavior stereotypically associated with that trait. Consider again the payphone and seminarian studies.
It may seem obvious that one cannot respond to all appeals for help, and it may seem doubtful that any reflective person thinks one should. So we should not expect helping behavior to be wholly consistent, given the complex situations in which persons find themselves.
Some of the philosophers discussed in this entry, such as the natural law theorists in section 3. The general point, on which most of the ancient and modern moralists would agree, is that being helpful cannot be understood in isolation from other values, aims, and traits that the individual has. For discussion of how values can be unified, see Wolf Or consider the Milgram experiments. In post-experiment interviews with subjects, Milgram noted that many were completely convinced of the wrongness of what they were doing.
But the presence of conflict need not indicate an absence, or loss, of character. They have character, but it is neither virtuous nor vicious. Many of us seem to fall into this category. We often recognize what it is right to do but we nevertheless do not do it. In short, the objectors say that the situationists rely on a simplified view of character.
They assume that behavior is often sufficient to indicate the presence of a trait of character, and they ignore the other psychological aspects of character both cognitive and affective that, for most of the philosophers discussed in this entry, form a more or less consistent and integrated set of beliefs and desires.
In particular, the objectors say, the situationists ignore the role of practical deliberation or, in the case of virtuous character, practical wisdom. For variations on these replies to the situationists, see Kupperman , Kamtekar , Radcliffe , Sabini and Silver , Sreenivasan , and cf. Some recent philosophical work on character aims to meet the skepticism of the situationist challenge directly, by developing a theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies that are compatible with the existence of robust traits.
This section provides a brief summary of two such approaches to virtue. For extensive and nuanced discussion, see Miller , and Section 2 of the entry on empirical approaches to moral character , section 2. Rather than looking for empirical evidence of robust traits in behavioral regularities across different types of situations, the CAPS model and philosophers impressed by this model focus on the importance of how agents understand the situations they are in.
These units are clusters of dispositions to feel, desire, believe, and plan that, once activated, cause various thoughts, feelings, and behavior to be formed. Philosophers who ground their understanding of virtue in this type of psychological theory extend the CAPS model to cover robust virtuous traits of character. These traits are viewed as enduring dispositions that include the appropriate clusters of thinking practical reason , desire, and feeling, manifested in cross-situational behavior.
Other philosophers do not find the extension of the CAPS model especially helpful, for it does not seem to move us past what we commonsenically recognize as virtue. We are prepared to begin with the idea that being virtuous is not just being disposed to act, but also to feel, respond, and to reason. And not simply to reason, but to reason well. For this approach to be helpful, we need some account of what excellent practical reasoning consists in.
Some philosophers aim to provide what is needed by looking to psychological studies of enjoyment. They propose that virtues are analogous to some skills, in that the kind of habituation involved in developing and acting from virtuous character is like the sort of intelligent habituation typical of the development and exercise of some complex skills. The empirical studies of enjoyment show that, other things being equal, we enjoy the exercise of developed abilities, and the more complex the ability, the more we enjoy its exercise.
If the acquisition and exercise of virtue is analogous to the development and exercise of complex ability, we can, this approach suggests, explain a variety of central points about virtuous activity — for example, that, like some skills, virtuous activity is experienced as being its own end, as being enjoyable in itself, and thus as valued for its own sake.
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