Concluding comments References Chapter 3: An industrial organization perspective on productivity Abstract 1. A productivity primer 2. Empirical facts about productivity at the producer level 3. A simple model of equilibrium productivity dispersion 4. Measurement of output and inputs 5.
Recovering productivity from the data 6. Productivity analysis 7. Looking ahead 8. Conclusion References Chapter 4: Dynamic games in empirical industrial organization Abstract 1. Models 3. Identification and estimation 4. Empirical applications 5. Concluding remarks References Chapter 5: Moment inequalities and partial identification in industrial organization Abstract 1.
Definitions and background 3. Revealed preference 4. Generalized discrete choice approaches 5. Estimation and inference 6. Implementation of partial identification 7. Conclusions References Chapter 6: Frictions in product markets Abstract 1. Transaction costs 3. Asymmetric information 4. Search frictions 5. Matching frictions References Chapter 7: Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects Abstract 1.
Monopoly 3. Competition for the market 4. Competition on the market 5. Alternative modeling of competition, coordination and beliefs 6.
Matching design 7. Identification of network effects 8. Estimating indirect network effects 9. Empirical work on pricing in platform studies Conclusion References Chapter 8: Information markets and nonmarkets Abstract 1.
A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO Ulrich Doraszelski and Ariel Pakes As theoretical dynamic models increase in complexity, in order to reflect a wide variety of possible economic environments, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain analytic characterizations of equilibrium outcomes. This chapter surveys methods for deriving numerical solutions in such games. With increases in computer processing speed and memory, it has become possible to analyze a richer set of environments, and to revisit issues such as mergers, where long run effects on entry and investment may be paramount.
Applications of these numerical solution methods have just begun to be introduced in the empirical analysis of dynamic oligopoly games, and we believe that some important advances will occur in the near future. Chapter 5. Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer These issues are prominent in markets where there are either direct or indirect benefits to purchasing the same product as many other customers, or where there are other costs associated with switching products.
Again, this topic was not covered substantively in the first two HIO volumes. Chapter 6. Auctions are an important trading process, and they have been widely adopted in sales of public assets. Economics has informed the design of auction mechanisms, as well as the analysis of bidding, such as the detection of collusion.
Chapter 7. A Primer on Foreclosure Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole This chapter surveys the literature on foreclosure, whereby output in one market is restricted by the exercise of market power in another market. There have been a number of subsequent developments, spurred on in part by several antitrust cases. Chapter 8. Chapter 9. Market Structure: Theory and Evidence John Sutton This chapter describes the determinants of market structure, including the size distribution of firms and industry turnover.
In contrast to the related chapter by Berry and Reiss, the focus is largely on differences across industries. Chapter It supplies an up-to-date account of the latest theory in the area, as well as recent developments in policy in the United States and Europe.
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